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DIFFICULTIES IN QUEENSLAND 
MILIIARY RAIL TRANSPORT 
by Alan Whiting 
Alan Whiting is a Railway Historian and author of Engine of Destruction: The 
Australian Standard Garratt Scandal covering a controversial aspect of the war. 
Few people are today aware of the significant contribution of the 
Queensland Government Railway system (Q.G.R.) to Australia's war 
effort fifty years ago. This paper examines the relationship between 
the railways and the Commonwealth, one which, born of the urgency 
and necessity of the moment, was far from co-ordinated and 
conducive to the free flow of War material. These aspects gained little 
publicity then or since. 
Australian manufacturing being predominantly in the south plus 
the use by United States supply vessels of Brisbane as one of their 
delivery points and the scarcity of local shipping and motor transport 
meant that the North Coast Line from Brisbane to Cairns was the 
safest and almost only method of transporting war material to 
northern ports and military establishments. 
Problems lay in four directions. Firstly, much of the line had been 
buih merely as short, cheaply constructed lines from one settlement 
to another with no long term goal of a true main line. Many grades 
at the southern end, were punishing, not to mention the sharp curves 
and very light weight of rail. Nearly all was single track and delays 
took place at crossing loops whilst oncoming trains slowly cleared 
the single track sections, sometimes over 10 miles long. 
The second problem was the rolling stock. As a consequence of 
being starved of modernisation capital during the previous two 
decades, the Q.G.R. had an ancient fleet of some 680 serviceable 
locomotives, over half of which had an average age approaching that 
at which it was more economical to sell them as scrap. Despite the 
recommendations of Royal Commissioners in the previous two 
decades, the Q.G.R. steadfastly refused to adopt modern, powerful 
locomotive technology. The result was technologically inferior, low 
powered locomotives capable of handling only slow, small and often 
overloaded trains, which, when the going got tough, with the strains 
of war, literally cracked under the effort. 
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The third problem was that the Commonwealth clearly did not 
know what it wanted. It took legal control of the Q.G.R. in late 1941, 
and set up the Commonwealth Land Transport Board to effect its 
transport requirements. No Queenslander served on that 12 member 
board, led by the legendary former Chairman of the Victorian 
Railways Commissioners, Harold Winthrop Clapp K.B.E., a man who 
was no friend of the States, and who is recorded as saying "Australians 
are just selfish and miserable people. They are not Australians 
primarily but State-ites." But perhaps Queensland's lack of 
representation can be explained by what must surely be one of the 
greatest unfulfilled prophecies of the War when the Australian Army's 
Director of Rail Transportation wrote to the Q.G.R.'s Commissioner, 
P.R.T. Wills in February, 1942 and opined that "there is not likely 
to be any considerable quantity of rail traffic for conveyance over the 
Queensland lines coming from the South". Strangely only one month 
before, he had told Wills that traffic increases on the Q.G.R. were 
to be "enormous". 
The fourth and most frightening prospect of all though was that 
even before the entry of Japan into the War, the Q.G.R. had believed 
the North Coast Line to have been saturated in its traffic capacity. 
As demands on the system built up over the first twelve months 
of the Pacific War, the disorganisation of military movement was 
appaUing. The Q.G.R. was grossly short of wagons, engine power and 
manpower, made worse by the Army which, from August to October 
1942, consigned 449 wagons of material to the wrong destinations. 
Individual officers placed their own wagon orders, so that scores of 
wagons were taken empty to destinations to which other wagons would 
be arriving for unloading. The Q.G.R. was particularly inconvenienced 
by secrecy and was sometimes given little notice of requirements of 
hundreds of wagons. A further problem was the delay in unloading 
by the military. For example, often the request for trains to clear 
personnel to the north from New South Wales arrived after the 
personnel themselves. The Army responded to complaints by stating 
that if there was a failure of co-ordination, it was not due to 
Headquarters in Melbourne. 
By May 1942 the relationship between Clapp and Wills had reached 
a low point. Despite its extreme locomotive shortage, the Q.G.R. had 
been pressed into sending eleven engines to the Commonwealth's own 
Central Australia Railway. Clapp accused Wills of ordering excessive 
locomotives from the United States under Lease-Lend rather than 
bringing workshop practice up to what Clapp termed "normal 
standards." There is no indication that in making this judgement, 
Clapp took into account the extent of Q.G.R.'s workshop resources 
given over to military use. One engine in nine was out of service, 
waiting weeks for repair. Regular maintenance programs were 
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impossible and mileage between overhauls stretched from a normal 
75,000 to 180,000 in some cases. Wills believed no other state in 
Australia had the same density of traffic on any 100 miles of railway 
as the Brisbane-Maryborough section, 48 trains per day in May 1942. 
He recommended that Queensland refuse to send any further 
locomotives for Commonwealth use, even if demanded under the 
National Security Regulations. His Minister agreed that the 
Commonwealth "was asking Queensland to do the impossible." 
By July 1943 mihtary demands had reached a crisis point. The Army 
had been asking for 63 trains per week but Q.G.R. could provide only 
40, despite cancelling services so as to free engines for military trains. 
The North Coast Line was closed for days at a time except for mihtary 
and perishable traffic. The problem was compounded by cattle and 
sugar seasons which normally imposed big demands on the rolling 
stock. United States' General Marshall was said to be very concerned 
that some 10,(X)0 personnel and 400 vehicles were stranded in Brisbane, 
unable to forward. The Commonweahh was demanding that the 
Q.G.R. shift non mihtary loading which Wills claimed it was 
impossible to do. By late July that the Q.G.R. admitted to the Army 
that it could not even fulfill military orders for traffic with "the very 
highest priority". 
Traffic statistics for 1943 are revealing. Some train crews were then 
working over 141 hours per fortnight. Traffic density from Brisbane 
to Gympie had increased from 49,825 in March 1939 to 104,983 in 
March, 1943, despite enormous congestion resulting in trains waiting 
1,743 hours at crossing loops on that section, over nine times that 
in March 1939. Some of the movements at this time were impressive. 
One is the shifting over part of the North Coast Line over five days 
of more than the equivalent of 1,100 four wheel open wagons of 
material for United States Authorities. 
All rail loading from New South Wales had to be transhipped at 
Clapham, Brisbane, or Wallangarra. By mid 1943 some 14,000 tons 
of military traffic was stranded along the New South Wales northern 
lines, unable to be transhipped. Wills was concerned that the Army 
was providing labour to tranship civilian as well as its own goods in 
Victoria but refused to organise similar labour in Queensland despite 
General Blamey's concern that the Q.G.R.'s inadequacy might gravely 
disrupt his operational plans. One General is alleged to have called 
Wills' attitude as defeatist when he pleaded that he could do no more 
without more resources. 
Clapp proposed to curtail civilian traffic consigned to Queensland 
with all applications for movement north of Brisbane being made to 
his Board. Wills told his Minister there was not the slightest 
justification as the Q.G.R. was in a far better position to assess the 
need for transport in Queensland and the proposal went no further. 
97 
The Commonwealth then put forward a long term plan involving 
massive expenditure increasing the number and length of crossing 
loops and providing more powerful engines on the North Coast Line, 
none of which had any prospect of early implementation given the 
inability of either Q.G.R. or Commonwealth to provide the necessary 
manpower. 
Although in October Blarney considered there was a possibility of 
considerably increased military requirements, that never eventuated 
and military traffic began to diminish from its peak in August 1943. 
In that month 30,600 military personnel, 37,000 civihans, 55,000 tons 
of mihtary loading and 70,500 tons of civilian loading had been 
conveyed north of Brisbane. 
With an increase of only 4 per cent in locomotive numbers from 
June 1939 to June 1945, the annual engine mileage rose from 16 to 
24.3 million miles. Gross ton miles reached 66 per cent above 
immediate pre-war levels. By any measure, and despite the lack of 
co-operation between Commonwealth and Queensland, the figures 
point to a spectacular and exceptionally valuable contribution to 
Australia's war effort. 
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